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The European Court of Human Rights’ 
Remedial Practice and its Impact on the 
Execution of Judgments 
 




This article analyses the developing approach of the European Court of Human Rights to the indication 
of specific non-monetary individual or general remedies and the impact of this practice on the 
execution of its judgments. It draws on interviews with Judges of the Court and officials in Council of 
Europe institutions, and a statistical analysis of pilot judgments and judgments that invoke Article 46 
of the European Convention of Human Rights issued between 2004 and 2016. The article argues that 
the Court’s remedial practice is fluid and pragmatic, with differences of perspective between Judges. 
It discusses the factors that influence judicial decision-making, and examines the implications of the 
Court’s remedial approach both for its ‘horizontal’ relationship with the Committee of Ministers and 
its ‘vertical’ relationship with states. It concludes that from both these perspectives, the door is open 
to continued evolution, if not revolution, in the Court’s remedial practice. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
How far does—or should—the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’ or ECtHR) recommend, 
or require, states to take certain measures after the finding of a violation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘the Convention’ or ECHR)? This question is of increasing judicial1 and academic2 
interest as the Court, driven by states’ failure to implement judgments, has, since the mid-2000s, 
moved away from its formerly limited, declaratory approach to remedial measures by sometimes 
being specific, or even prescriptive, in the non-monetary individual measures and/or general 
measures indicated.3 It has done so both by means of pilot judgments4 and judgments invoking Article 
46 (on the binding force and execution of judgments), in which the Court indicates remedial measures, 
often as regards systemic or structural problems, without applying the pilot judgment procedure. For 
reasons explained below, both types of judgment are included in our analysis.  
The Court’s remedial practice forms part of a wider discussion about its role in the post-judgment 
phase vis-à-vis the Committee of Ministers (CM), the political body charged under Article 46(2) of the 
Convention with supervising the execution of judgments. Two divided Grand Chamber judgments in 
2017, Moreira Ferreira v Portugal (No. 2) v Portugal5 and Burmych and Others v Ukraine,6 exposed 
judicial disagreement on, inter alia, the Court’s competence to specify remedial measures, the 
institutional roles of the Court and the CM in matters of execution, and the legal effect of inserting 




                                                             
1 Keller and Marti, ‘Reconceptualizing Implementation: The Judicialization of the Implementation of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2015) 26(4) European Journal of International Law 829; Sicilianos, 
‘The Involvement of the European Court of Human Rights in the Implementation of its Judgments: Recent 
Developments under Article 46 ECHR’ (2014) 32(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 235.   
2 Çalı, ‘Explaining Variation in the Intrusiveness of Regional Human Rights Remedies in Domestic Orders’ (2018) 
16(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 214; Jahn, ‘Ruling (In)directly through Individual Measures?: 
Effect and Legitimacy of the ECtHR’s New Remedial Power’ (2014) 74 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 1; 
Leach, ‘No Longer Offering Fine Mantras to a Parched Child? The European Court of Human Rights’ Developing 
Approach to Remedies’ in Føllesdal, Peters and Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human 
Rights in a National, European and Global Context (2013) 142; Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ Indication of Remedial Measures’ (2017) 17 Human Rights Law Review 451; Paraskeva, 
‘European Court of Human Rights: From Declaratory Judgments to Indications of Specific Measures’ (2018) 1 
European Human Rights Law Review 4.  
3 Under Article 46(1) ECHR, a state’s obligation to abide by the Court’s final judgments in cases against it entails, 
besides the payment of any sums awarded, the adoption, where required, of individual measures to put an end 
to violation(s) established and erase their consequences so as to achieve as far as possible restitutio in integrum; 
and of general measures preventing similar violations in the future.  
4 The Court may initiate the pilot judgment procedure where an application reveals the existence of a structural 
or systemic problem which has given or may give rise to similar applications. In a pilot judgment, the Court 
identifies both the nature of the problem as well as the type of remedial measures which the state is required 
to take: see Rule 61 Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, 16 April 2018.    
5 Application No 19867/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 July 2017 (Grand Chamber). See Donald and Speck, 
‘Judges at Odds over Court’s Authority to Order Remedies’, Strasbourg Observers, Blog, 28 July 2017.  




A.   Specificity and prescriptiveness 
This article adopts a two-tier typology distinguishing between, on the one hand, the degree of 
specificity and, on the other hand, the degree of prescriptiveness applied by the Court in judgments 
that are not purely declaratory. Specificity refers to the degree of detail contained in the indication of 
particular non-monetary individual or general measures, whether in the main body or the operative 
provisions of a judgment: the more specific the judgment, the less discretion remains to the state as 
to what remedial measure is required and possibly also by when it should be achieved. Specific non-
monetary individual measures7 are inherently more ‘discretion-reducing’8 than general measures, 
which commonly include guiding principles or desired outcomes rather than precise measures or 
means that the state should adopt (see Section 4.A.i).9 Prescriptiveness is conceptualised as being on 
a spectrum, ranging from declaratory judgments that merely find a violation, to recommendatory 
judgments that provide for remedial indications in the main body of the judgment, to prescriptive 
judgments that contain directions in the operative part. While pilot judgments are inherently 
prescriptive, Article 46 judgments are commonly recommendatory and only rarely prescriptive (see 
Section 2.C).10 We regard the distinction between specificity and prescriptiveness as relevant because 
prescriptions in the operative part may be unspecific; indeed, the Court may expressly reject the 
option of specificity because of the complexity of domestic legal or policy issues involved, or because 
the CM is deemed better placed to consider the measures required.11 The distinction matters, too, 
because directions in the operative part, even if they are relatively imprecise, may, according to a 
senior Registry official, send a ‘stronger message’12 to the state than indications elsewhere in the 
judgment. 
We acknowledge, however, that the distinction between recommendatory and prescriptive 
judgments is contestable in view of judicial disagreement as to the precise legal effect of indicating 
remedial measures in the operative part as opposed to the main body of a judgment. According to 
Judge Spano, recommendations ‘have ... only the status of obiter dicta, in the form of guidance for the 
execution process’,13 while for Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, ‘obligations imposed in the operative part 
and those included only in the reasoning ... have the same legal force’.14 Matters are not clarified by 
the fact that the Court uses a range of mandatory language both inside and outside the operative part 
of judgments; indeed, one Judge has lamented that the Court has too often been ‘uneven, confusing 
                                                             
7 See, for example, Youth Initiative for Human Rights v Serbia Application No 48135/06, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 25 June 2013, at para 32 and operative part, at para 4.      
8 Jahn, supra n 2 at 23. See also Paraskeva, supra n 2 at 53; Sicilianos, supra n 1 at 246-7. 
9 See Samaras and Others v Greece Application No 11463/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 February 2012 at 
para 73, for an indication of general measures that leave significant discretion to the respondent state. By 
contrast, the general measures indicated in Ghavtadze v Georgia Application No 23204/07, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 3 March 2009 at para 105, are very specific.  
10 See, for example, Lukenda v Slovenia Application No 23032/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 6 October 2005, 
operative part, para 5. 
11 See, for example, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v Ukraine Application No 40450/04, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
15 October 2009, at paras 90-92. 
12 Interview, 8 November 2017.   
13 Presentation by Judge Robert Spano, Seminar on the Evolving Remedial Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, 8 November 2017 at 2. 
14 Moreira Ferreira v Portugal (No. 2), supra n 5, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by six 




and inconsistent with the substance of the message it wished to convey’ to states.15 As we shall see in 
4.A.i and ii, inconsistency on the Court’s part may jeopardise the prospects for successful 
implementation. We discuss at Section 5 the corresponding need for greater consistency in these 
aspects of judicial practice.  
 
B.   Scope and Methodology 
Judge Sicilianos observes extra-judicially that the Court generally recommends or prescribes remedial 
measures, either in a pilot or Article 46 judgment, having considered three factors: the existence of 
an underlying structural or systemic problem; the type and scale of the execution measure required; 
and the nature, seriousness and/or persistence of the violation.16 These factors capture an emerging 
pattern in the Court’s case law, whilst not having been articulated as a set of consistently applied 
criteria. This article does not attempt to reproduce the excellent analyses of the Court’s remedial 
practice that have been written by Judge Sicilianos and others from a largely jurisprudential 
perspective,17 but builds on them in two ways. These relate to, first, our methodology,18 and, secondly, 
our focus on the implications of the Court’s remedial practice for the supervision of the execution of 
judgments by the CM—an acknowledged research gap.19   
The methodology is innovative in two respects compared to other scholarly work. First, it involved 
direct engagement with Judges, and officials in the Court’s Registry, the Department for the Execution 
of Judgments of the ECtHR (‘Execution Department’) and the Secretariat of the CM, in order to 
ascertain at first-hand their perspectives on the Court’s remedial practice. This involved of interviews 
with three Judges and 12 officials or former officials in Strasbourg, and a public seminar held at the 
Council of Europe in November 2017, in which a further five Judges participated.20 In addition, our 
findings are informed by interviews with a range of actors at national level, which focused inter alia 
on domestic responsiveness to specific remedial indications.21  
The second innovative aspect of the methodology is a statistical analysis of both pilot judgments 
and Article 46 judgments issued between 2004 and 2016.22 Some recent studies23 of the Court’s 
remedial practice have chosen to focus solely on Article 46 judgments on the basis that, as Mowbray 
                                                             
15 Ibid. at Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kūris joined by three others, para 2.   
16 Sicilianos, supra n 1 at 244.   
17 Supra n 2.  
18 This research was undertaken from 2017 to 2018 as part of the Human Rights Law Implementation Project 
(HRLIP), see www.bristol.ac.uk/law/hrlip/ [last accessed 8 August 2018), involving the universities of Bristol, 
Essex, Middlesex and Pretoria and the Open Society Justice Initiative, and funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council in the UK [Grant No ES/M008819/1]. The project examined human rights law implementation 
across Europe, Africa and the Americas, looking at selected judgments and decisions of regional human rights 
and United Nations treaty bodies. 
19 Keller and Marti, supra n 1 at 839; Mowbray, supra n 2 at 474.  
20 Report of Seminar on the Evolving Remedial Practice of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 8 
November 2017 (‘Strasbourg Seminar Report’).  
21 As part of the HRLIP, more than 50 interviews were conducted in Belgium, the Czech Republic and Georgia.  
22 The Court issued its first pilot judgment in 2004 in Broniowski v Poland Application No 31443/96, Merits, 22 
June 2004 (Grand Chamber), which also marked the start of its more frequent use of Article 46, although it had 
occasionally specified remedial measures before. 




notes,24 the pilot judgment procedure is a separate, codified25 category of judgment. Yet we analyse 
both because our interest was to capture every ruling in which the Court had opted to be specific 
and/or prescriptive.26  
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our statistical analysis, providing an empirical 
context for the article. Section 3 explores how Judges decide whether to be specific and/or 
prescriptive, and identifies developments relating to the Court’s horizontal relationship with the CM 
and vertical relationship with states, which have led it cautiously to assume a role in the 
implementation of its judgments. Section 4 assesses perceptions among Strasbourg and domestic 
actors about the impact of the Court’s remedial approach at the execution stage. It finds that actors 
within the Court might overstate the risks of a more proactive stance on remedies while other actors 
vindicate its current, cautious and pragmatic practice and point to the tangible advantages of greater 
directiveness. Section 5 concludes with an outlook on how the Court’s remedial practice is likely to 
develop as Judges balance the competing demands of consistency and pragmatism.   
 
2.   SPECIFICITY AND PRESCRIPTIVENESS: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
This section presents statistical findings covering the period 2004 to 201627 in respect of the frequency 
with which the Court issued pilot and Article 46 judgments (A); the frequency with which it specified 
individual or general measures (B); the use of the operative part in Article 46 judgments (C); and any 
patterns in the use of pilot and Article 46 judgments against particular states and by different sections 
of the Court (D). Finally, the main trends are summarised (E).   
 
A.   Frequency of Judgments Specifying Remedial Measures  
 
Discussion of the Court’s remedial practice is often premised on the assumption—shared by several 
of our interviewees—that it is increasingly specific or prescriptive in its judgments, while 
acknowledging that such judgments remain a small minority of the total number of adverse rulings.28 
We sought to ascertain whether there was proof for this perceived trend, which has led some ‘insiders’ 
to argue that the Court should cease to refer to remedial indications as being exceptional.29 Between 
2004 and 2016, the Court issued 29 pilot judgments and almost six times as many Article 46 judgments 
                                                             
24 Mowbray, supra n 2 at 451-2. 
25 Rule 61 Rules of Court, supra n 4. Prior to that, Committee of Ministers, Res(2004)3, 12 May 2004 invited the 
Court, inter alia, ‘to identify, in its judgments finding a violation of the Convention, what it considers to be an 
underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in particular when it is likely to give rise to 
numerous applications, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers 
in supervising the execution of judgments.’  
26 Sicilianos, supra n 1 also considers both types of judgment.  
27 For reasons of space, we omit discussion of the Court’s use of deadlines in respect of remedial measures, 
which are a standard feature of pilot judgments but are rarely used in Article 46 judgments.  
28 Mowbray, supra n 2 at 451; Paraskeva, supra n 2 at 46.   
29 Keller and Marti, supra n 1 at 842; Moreira Ferreira (No 2), supra n 5 at Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de 




(170).30 Chart 1a shows that from 2004 to 2009, there was an upward trend overall in the number of 
Article 46 judgments, since when the numbers have fluctuated, peaking, for no apparent reason, in 
2014 (when the Court issued 31 Article 46 judgments) and declining in 2015 (when nine were issued). 
The number of pilot judgments has also fluctuated, although less dramatically, ranging from zero to 
seven in any given year.  
 
Chart 1a:  Total numbers of pilot judgments and Article 46 judgments, 2004-16 
 
Chart 1b shows that in every year from 2004 to 2016, the number of judgments containing specific 
remedial measures was tiny as a percentage of all adverse Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments. 
Even at its peak in 2014, this number represented only six per cent of all such judgments (34 out of 
548); the average from 2004 to 2016 was just two per cent.31 Thus, the figures, at least from 2009 
onwards, do not show a significant trend either upwards or downwards but rather a natural 
                                                             
30 Locating Article 46 judgments is difficult, since the allocation of Keywords on the Court’s HUDOC database is 
unreliable. Thus, having searched for Article 46 judgments on HUDOC, using both ‘Article’ and ‘Keyword’ filters, 
the results were manually checked. First, we eliminated ‘false positives’, including (i) Chamber judgments 
specifying remedial measures that were later overturned by the Grand Chamber; (ii) judgments in which the 
Court had considered specifying remedial measures but ultimately decided not to; and (iii) judgments containing 
‘hypothetical’ indications to the effect that removal of an applicant from a state would violate the Convention. 
Secondly, we sought to identify missing Article 46 judgments, by checking annual reports of the CM, which have 
since 2013 contained Article 46 judgments that became final in that year; and the Court’s annual reports, which 
have since 2013 contained a list of ‘judgments with indications of relevance for the execution (under Article 46)’. 
Finally, we added cases referred to in academic literature or in judgments. We also included nine judgments in 
which the Court indicated non-monetary remedies in the body of a judgment or in the operative part without 
including an Article 46 chapter (sometimes including these within an Article 41 chapter). We are grateful to 
Øyvind Stiansen of the University of Oslo for assistance with this aspect of our methodology.  
31 These percentages were derived by calculating the number of pilot and Article 46 judgments as a proportion 




fluctuation. For the past decade, therefore, it cannot be said that the Court has become increasingly 
specific or prescriptive.  
 
Chart 1b:   Article 46 and pilot judgments as percentage of all adverse judgments, 2004-16 
 
B.   Use of Individual and General Measures  
 
The two forms of non-monetary remedies provided for under the Convention are individual measures, 
which are designed to achieve, as far as possible, restitutio in integrum for the applicant, and general 
measures, which address structural or systemic defects identified in the judgment.32 Chart 2a shows 
that between 2004 and 2016, the Court was more likely to indicate general measures than individual 
measures in Article 46 judgments (125 compared to 79)33—a noteworthy finding given the attention 
that has been focused on the more ‘discretion-reducing’ individual measures.34 While the figures vary 
annually, reflecting the fluctuations (shown in Chart 1a) in the overall number of Article 46 judgments, 
there is an upward trend in the Court’s specification of general measures in Article 46 judgments from 
2004-16, while for individual measures the trend is almost flat. From 2009 onwards, general measures 
exceeded individual measures every year apart from 2012. In respect of pilot judgments, Chart 2b 
shows that out of the total of 29 issued between 2004 and 2016, four contained an order concerning 
individual measures to be taken (alongside general measures which are an inherent feature of pilot 
judgments). 
                                                             
32 Supra n 3. 
33 A total of 34 Article 46 judgments indicated both individual and general measures, which were counted twice 
in order to reflect the Court’s overall tendency to indicate measures.   





Chart 2a:  Article 46 judgments indicating at least one individual or general measure, 2004-16 
 
 






C.   Use of the Operative Part 
 
Analysis was conducted to determine how often the Court has chosen to indicate individual and/or 
general measures in the operative part of Article 46 judgments.35 The Court has always been cautious 
in its use of operative measures: Chart 3 shows that from 2006 onwards, the Court specified remedial 
measures in the body of Article 46 judgments far more often than it did in the operative part. Further, 
there was a decline in the use of the operative part from 2013 to 2016; however, it is premature to 
assess whether this apparent trend will continue. Further analysis reveals that individual measures, 
which as shown in Chart 2a are outnumbered by general measures in Article 46 judgments, are over-
represented in judgments that indicate measures in the operative part. This may be unsurprising in 
view of the fact that Judges, wary of ordering an ill-conceived measure (see 3.B.i), feel more 
comfortable to be prescriptive as regards individual measures, where the nature of the violation tends 
to leave no real alternative.36   
 
Chart 3:  Remedial indications contained in the operative part or in the main body of Article 46 
judgments, 2004-16 
 
D.   Patterns with Respect to States and Sections of the Court  
 
A question raised during our interviews was whether there are any unusual patterns with regards to 
either (i) the states against which pilot or Article 46 judgments have been issued or (ii) the tendency 
                                                             
35 Pilot judgments are excluded because they always include indication(s) in the operative part.  
36 Jahn, supra n 2 at 24. See, e.g., Assanidze v Georgia Application No 71503/01, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 




of particular Sections37 of the Court to issue such judgments. The answer is that there appear to be no 
such unusual patterns.  
In terms of respondent states, eight of the ten states that received the highest number of pilot and 
Article 46 judgments between 2004-16 are also among the ten highest count states for the total 
number of adverse Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments during that period; with the exception of 
a few anomalies, it does not appear that any (type of) state has been singled out by the Court in 
respect of its decision to be specific and/or prescriptive in its judgments—or, conversely, has 
disproportionately escaped the use of such judgments.38 The fact that the highest count states have 
not received a disproportionate share of judgments with remedial indications might be somewhat 
unexpected, in view of the preponderance of structural and systemic problems in those states which 
might be thought to be susceptible to greater specificity and/or prescriptiveness. As we shall see in 
3.B.i and ii, one explanation for this finding may be that, in deciding on their remedial strategy, Judges 
will seek, on a case-by-case basis, to anticipate whether specificity and/or prescriptiveness will indeed 
aid implementation, and there may be pragmatic considerations for refraining from (or deferring) 
giving remedial indications. This may be why there is no pattern of any (types of) state being 
consistently treated in any particular way in respect of the Court’s remedial practice.    
Similarly, it cannot be said that there are any ‘rogue’ Sections which issue either a 
disproportionately high or low number of pilot or Article 46 judgments; rather, the proportion of such 
judgments issued by each Section roughly corresponds to the overall number of adverse judgments 
that each has delivered, as indicated below.39  
Section of the Court Percentage of pilot and Article 
46 Chamber judgments issued 
by each Section, 2004-16  
Percentage of Chamber judgments 
finding a violation issued by each 
Section, 2004-16  
Section I 18 24 
Section II 28 26 
Section III 20 18 
Section IV 25 18 





                                                             
37 The 47 Judges of the Court are divided into five Sections, each of which is responsible for a certain number of 
states. We omitted Grand Chamber judgments from this analysis because our interest was in elucidating 
whether specific (types of) states had been treated differently in terms of specificity and/or prescriptiveness. 
38 The ten states against which most Article 46 and pilot judgments were issued in 2004-16 were: Turkey (with a 
combined total of 29), Russia (22), Romania (15), Bulgaria (13), Poland (12), Ukraine (11), Italy (10), Serbia (10), 
Greece (9) and Albania (9). Of these, only Albania and Serbia were not among the ten highest count states, 
identified by a HUDOC search. A total of 29 states had had at least one Article 46 or pilot judgment delivered 
against them; 18 states had not been a party to either type of case.   




E.   Conclusion  
 
Judgments specifying remedial measures remain a small fraction of the Court's case law and their use 
has—contrary to some perceptions—not increased in recent years but rather fluctuates year-by-year. 
Further, the Court indicates general measures far more often than individual measures in both Article 
46 and pilot judgments. The use of the operative part of Article 46 judgments to specify remedies is 
low—and perhaps declining. Rather, it is the Court’s established practice to indicate remedial 
measures more often in the main body of Article 46 judgments. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest 
a disproportionate use—or avoidance—of specific or prescriptive judgments either in respect of 
particular states or by certain Sections of the Court.  
 
3.   THE COURT’S CAUTIOUS STEPS INTO THE EXECUTION FIELD 
 
How did the situation outlined above come about? This section explores on what basis the Court 
decides upon its remedial approach during the judgment phase; that is, the point in time when a 
Chamber or Grand Chamber examines the materials before it and makes an assessment on the merits. 
We identify growing recognition that the Court has a role in the execution of its own judgments (A.i), 
which is reflected in increasing interaction between the Court and the CM (A.ii). We then explore the 
factors that influence Judges’ decision to, occasionally, go beyond issuing purely declaratory 
judgments (B), notably their limited knowledge of the situation on the ground (B.i); expectations 
regarding the receptiveness of the respondent state to remedial indications (B.ii) and considerations 
relating to the institutional set-up under the Convention (B.iii). We conclude that, while these factors 
might be perceived as closing the door to greater specificity and prescriptiveness, the door is left ajar 
by the Court’s strengthening resolve to address problems of non-implementation, combined with 
corresponding calls from the Execution Department for it to do so (B.iv).  
 
A.   Changing Perceptions of the Court’s Role  
 
(i)   Growing recognition that there is a role for the Court regarding execution 
 
The Court’s remedial approach was traditionally premised on the view that execution is the exclusive 
realm of the CM, with no role whatsoever for the Court.40 Indeed, the Court continues to refer to its 
judgments as being ‘essentially declaratory’,41 and our interviewees detected a presumption among 
Judges and Registry officials that judgments should be as declaratory as possible unless the nature of 
the violation found demands otherwise. However, we also found growing awareness among Judges 
and Court staff that the indication of remedies and the use of mandatory language in a judgment may 
affect the prospects for its implementation, and a view that the Court ought to be conscious of 
execution matters. This was, our interviews suggest, prompted by the realisation that specificity and 
prescriptiveness were a means to address systemic or structural human rights deficiencies that were 
                                                             
40 Mowbray, supra n 2 at 2; Sicilianos, supra n 1 at 236.  
41 Among the most commonly cited is Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland (No. 2) Application 




threatening to overwhelm the Court with repetitive applications.42 This led, in 2004, to the 
introduction of the pilot judgment procedure and, simultaneously, an increased use of remedial 
indications under Article 46 (see 2.A), out of concern to handle repetitive cases more efficiently and 
to aid states in discharging their obligations under Article 46 ECHR43—a concern manifested in the 
statistics, which evince that the number of general measures far outweighs the number of individual 
measures recommended or prescribed by the Court (see 2.B).   
 
(ii)   Increasing interaction between the Court and the Committee of Ministers 
 
The imperative to aid execution is reflected in intensified contact between the Court and the CM, 
which takes three forms. First, interlocutors pointed to increasing staff mobility between Strasbourg 
institutions; a small number of Registry lawyers who had temporarily been seconded to the Execution 
Department or the Secretariat of the CM were said to have returned to the Court with an awareness 
of execution problems and the capacity to create a new structural link between the Department and 
the Registry.44 Secondly, in 2016, some previously seconded lawyers started to deliver training to 
other Registry officials about how implementation may be affected by the way in which a judgment is 
drafted. One trainer highlighted the need to sensitise Registry staff to the work of the CM;45 for 
example, to prevent the redundant use of the ‘Öcalan clause’ (concerning the re-opening of criminal 
proceedings following an unfair trial46) in cases where the state routinely allows for re-opening at the 
applicant’s request (as most do)47 or, conversely, random omissions of the clause in cases where the 
state cannot confidently be expected to reopen proceedings should the applicant so desire. The 
training, she confirmed, had helped to dispel ‘[the myth that] execution doesn’t work’, or is not the 
Court’s concern. A Judge concurred, stressing that drafting lawyers today possess greater aptitude to 
identify, in collaboration with the Judge Rapporteur,48 cases in which an Article 46 chapter may be 
warranted.49  
The third factor is an intensified flow of information from the CM and the Execution Department 
to the Court. This takes three forms: first, information on the execution of judgments has become 
more accessible, notably through the HUDOC-EXEC database50 and the CM’s annual reports,51 allowing 
Registry staff ‘to follow what they are doing on the other side’.52 Specifically, HUDOC-EXEC enables 
                                                             
42 Interview, 28 June 2017. See also Keller and Marti, supra n 1 at 830; Leach, supra n 2 at 161. 
43 See also Mowbray, supra n 2 at 18. 
44 One interlocutor from the Court, interviewed on 3 May 2018, added that the secondment of Registry staff to 
other Council of Europe bodies, such as the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, had also created useful 
synergies.  
45 Interview, 19 April 2017.   
46 Öcalan v Turkey Application No 46221/99, 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber) at para 210. 
47 Steering Committee for Human Rights, The longer-term future of the system of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, June 2016, para 152. 
48 The Judge Rapporteur is designated by the relevant Section or Grand Chamber President to examine an 
individual application and to, inter alia, ‘submit such reports, drafts and other documents as may assist the 
Chamber or the Committee or the respective President in carrying out their functions’ (Rule 49 § 3 (c) of the 
Rules of Court, supra n 4). 
49 Interview, 13 June 2017.  
50 The HUDOC-EXEC database (hudoc.exec.coe.int) was launched in January 2017 and includes documents 
relating to execution of both pending and closed cases. 
51 See, most recently, Council of Europe, Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights 2017, 11th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers, Strasbourg, March 2018.  




Judges and drafting lawyers to learn about the state of implementation of earlier judgments relating 
to a question before them. Secondly, thematic debates organised by the CM and involving Registry 
staff provide opportunities to consider the interplay between the judgment and post-judgment 
phases.53 Thirdly, recent years have seen a few informal tripartite meetings between senior members 
of the CM’s Secretariat, Heads of Divisions of the Execution Department and Registrars of the Court,54 
to ‘raise the awareness of the Registry, as drafters of the judgments, of the potential problems that 
the judgment may trigger in the field of execution’.55 Two Judges informed us that their respective 
Sections had also had irregular occasional meetings with senior staff of the Execution Department, 
and one was planning to repeat this exercise. A former senior Registry official underscored the need 
for such meetings, lamenting continuing misconceptions among some Judges who ‘divorce 
themselves from the reality of the whole picture [of execution]’.56 
Where growing awareness of execution prompts the Court to consider providing remedial 
guidance, the Judge Rapporteur enjoys significant leeway to suggest a course of action in terms of 
specificity and/or prescriptiveness.57 They will give instructions for drafting, following which a more 
collaborative process will ensue—involving the drafting lawyer and/or the quality-checking Registrar58 
as well as the Judge Rapporteur—before the draft is presented to the relevant judicial formation. 
Ultimately, the decision about whether to give specific remedial indications is a judicial one.59 
Meanwhile, the Office of the Jurisconsult, among whose functions is to review, before the deliberation 
of a judicial formation, the draft judgments and to make suggestions in terms of the case law,60 may, 
for example, propose that reference be inserted to certain reforms or developments relating to the 
implementation of a previous case on the same matter. The Deputy Jurisconsult, interviewed in April 
2017, confirmed that the Office strives to ensure coherence in respect of the Court’s jurisprudence on 
Article 46 (as well as Article 41) ECHR just as it does regarding substantive provisions. 
In summary, growing awareness of the execution process and an increasing flow of information 
and expertise from the Execution Department and CM to the Court appear to signal a new phase in 
the relationship between the two institutions. We shall see in the following that this has allowed the 
Court to form more realistic expectations as to a state’s likely receptiveness to remedial directions, 
even as it remains mindful not to undermine the principle of subsidiarity or disrupt the institutional 
balance established by the Convention.  
 
                                                             
53 See, e.g., Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Thematic debate on conditions of detention, 13 March 
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55 Interview (a), 2 May 2017.   
56 Interview, 19 April 2017.  
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58 The role of the drafting lawyer is to assist the Judge in drafting reports and judgments for the Court. In doing 
so, they should follow the instructions of the Judge, adhere to the Court’s case-law and follow the internal 
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59 Interview, 3 May 2017. See also 3.B.iii. 
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B.   Factors Affecting Judges’ Remedial Strategy 
 
This section identifies factors which inform the Court’s decision on whether (and how) to indicate 
remedies. These relate to both the vertical relationship between the Court and the states parties, as 
well as the horizontal relationship between the Court and the CM. 
 
(i)   The Court’s (limited) knowledge of the complexities on the ground  
 
The first reason why Judges are cautious is their awareness that by giving remedial indications, they 
are straying into policy-based analysis requiring a contextualised understanding of the political and 
legal environment in the respondent state. One Judge identified a particular risk that ill-conceived 
general measures could discredit the Court and frustrate implementation because,  
you are examining extraneous factors which are not in front of you, and ... you are making ... a 
speculative assessment of what is the best way to move forward domestically and what are the 
capabilities of the state in question.61 
Judges had an ‘instinctive aversion’ to indicating remedies based on mere speculation, and this was 
exacerbated by the fact that in Article 46 cases, unlike in pilot judgments,62 the issue of remedies is 
almost never part of the pleadings of the parties to a case before the Court.63 Proposals to address 
this issue are discussed at section 5. We note, however, that even on those rare occasions when the 
applicant does invite the Court to give specific remedial indications, Judges may still decline to do so.64  
A Registry official confirmed the difficulty of assessing the ramifications of remedial indications on 
the domestic plane: ‘[T]he Court’s vision of the whole situation is narrower than [that of] the 
Committee of Ministers’,65 given the latter’s experience in supervising the implementation of general 
measures across states and the Execution Department’s corresponding ability to provide assistance 
drawn from good practices from other states.66 A Judge added that states may emulate each other’s 
good practice, ‘but this is … happening in the process of execution, not in the Court.’67 It has been 
noted that the ECtHR, having jurisdiction over 47 states, recognises how remote it is from 
circumstances on the ground.68 Interviewees in Strasbourg were also aware of this. As one Judge 
noted:  
                                                             
61 Interview, 13 June 2017.  
62 Where the Court is considering applying the pilot judgment procedure, the parties are invited, pursuant to 
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65 Interview, 8 November 2017. 
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the Convention, of supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments.  
67 Interview, 23 May 2017. 
68 Huneeus, ‘Reforming the State from Afar: Structural Reform Litigation at the Human Rights Courts’ (2015) 




[S]ometimes we don’t know enough about the specific situation in a country so we have to be 
... careful … that we are not imposing too much on the state because each state is different.... 
And [we should not] replace the legislator—that would be difficult as well.69  
For the Court to make a determination about suitable general measures even in complex matters 
seems least problematic where the Court is merely clarifying which of a range of possible actions 
identified by the parties themselves it endorses.70 This will most often be the case where reforms are 
already underway or being debated at the domestic and supranational level, in the context of the 
judgments pending before the CM. This reaffirms the view taken by several interlocutors within the 
Court that the decision about whether to adopt a pilot or an Article 46 judgment will be influenced by 
the ‘history of execution’71 where there have been similar cases. Our interviews confirmed that Judges 
may not content themselves in this scenario with merely appraising ongoing reform processes, but 
seek to inject urgency into the reforms and/or influence their direction, by seeking out willing actors 
at the domestic level (see 4.B.i).  
We found agreement among our interlocutors in the Court that their capacity to appraise the 
domestic policy context is aided not only by the heightened transparency of the Execution Department 
and CM, but also by the ‘national Judge’ sitting in the relevant Chamber or Grand Chamber 
formation,72 whose inside view was deemed ‘essential’ to help the Court gauge the feasibility of 
suggested remedial measures.73  
Yet, the Court is aware not only of its geographical distance from events on the ground, but also 
the lapse in time between the facts at the origin of an application and judicial determination of the 
case, especially in the absence of any reference to remedial measures in the pleadings. This means 
that by the time the Court examines an application on the merits, any remedial indication—designed 
for the future—may have become obsolete.74 This recognition has led Judges to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to indicating remedies, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. Notably, indications as regards 
general measures in complex, technical cases such as those under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
ECHR (the right to peaceful enjoyment of property) concerning, for example, restitution for properties 
nationalised under communist regimes, will rarely be very specific, but instead tend to leave wide 
discretion to the state to determine precisely what is the most appropriate remedial action.75  
Finally, in cases concerning structural shortcomings, Judges will ordinarily discuss when would be 
the optimal moment to move beyond merely declaring a(nother) violation. For example, Judges 
sometimes adopt an Article 46 judgment as a precursor to a pilot judgment, highlighting an emerging 
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structural or systemic problem, and ‘[putting] the government on notice’ that the Court may be left 
with no option but to escalate the matter.76   
 
(ii)   Anticipated state reaction: Risk of pushback? 
 
Our interviewees further suggest that the Court’s caution about using pilot and Article 46 judgments 
stems from a concern that states may push back against remedial indications which are viewed as 
imposing unrealistic expectations or interfering unduly with domestic decision-making.77  
Against this background, the Court recognises that it would be futile to order remedies which will 
foreseeably not be implemented, and it will seek to draw inferences as to the likelihood of the state 
engaging, in good faith, in the implementation process from its previous record.78 This is particularly 
true as regards pilot and Article 46 judgments using prescriptive language in the operative part. One 
Judge explained that the Court would usually refrain from issuing a pilot judgment unless the state 
had signalled its ability and willingness to cooperate,79 adding: ‘[Capacity and political will] are 
cumulative conditions and very often they are not met so then a pilot procedure is useless.’80 The 
same strategic considerations may influence decisions about prescriptive individual measures of 
redress, as a Registry official ventured: 
[I]f we think the individual measure indicated will not be followed, the Court will be reluctant 
to introduce that in the operative part… It could put in question the legitimacy of the Court…. 
The Court indicates such measures that [it] thinks will be executed.81 
Yet other interviewees within the Court took a more nuanced view about how appropriate it was to 
allow concerns regarding possible backlash to influence its remedial practice. Based on the premise 
that states ought to accept some indications, the Judges will seek to ascertain where their ‘breaking 
point’ is, which, as one Judge noted, varies from case to case and from state to state.82 He insisted 
that the Court should take  
a principled view on the types of situation that merit the Court providing for individual or 
general measures and the possible backlash in a state should not be a relevant factor. Whether 
that backlash occurs or not is simply an issue of reality and how that goes back and forth is a 
difficult situation to assess...  
At the same time, capturing the delicate balance that must be achieved by the Court, he added that, 
‘if we’re going to have a situation where the Court provides for remedial measures which are 
consistently being rejected, what is the point of the whole enterprise?’  
This type of strategic thinking by the Court about the likely efficacy of its remedial approach in a 
given case might create an actual or perceived risk that applicants in certain cases or states may be 
less likely to see the Court recommend or prescribe specific remedies. In fact, Judges have avoided 
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80 Ibid. 
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either disproportionately singling out or excluding certain states from a more directive approach, as 
evinced by the statistics presented at Section 2.D. For the time being, then, we have found no evidence 
that the Court is seen to have trodden more lightly with ‘unreceptive’ states; rather, its overriding 
purpose is to achieve the best possible outcome for the victim (and potential future victims) by using 
a variety of remedial strategies. As Judges develop their remedial practice, this imperative must 
prevail, lest pragmatism should lead to different levels of redress for applicants in different states.     
 
(iii)   Concern about institutional balance  
 
A third consideration which informs Judges’ strategic thinking about remedies is a concern to respect 
the institutional balance between the Court and the CM. This concern cuts in two directions: the Court 
is anxious to protect (and be seen to protect) judicial independence and, at the same time, it does not 




We saw in Section 3.B.i. that there is an increasing level of ‘awareness-raising, sensitisation [and] 
familiarisation’83 about execution among actors within the Court. Nevertheless, our interviews reveal 
that the Court has been sensitive to the need to keep a firewall between itself and the CM during the 
judgment phase. As one Judge ventured:  
The concern at the Court is always [about] independence. Of course, at the level of the Registry, 
there is a lot of back and forth, but the Judges themselves—we do our jobs and we are not 
influenced by politics. That is a very ‘holy’ line that we want to take.84  
While this does not preclude any contact, it imposes clear restrictions on what contact there can be: 
it ought to be formal interaction on thematic areas rather than ‘backdoor discussions’ on specific cases 
prior to the Court issuing its judgment. Encouraging Registrars to maintain contact with the Heads of 
Divisions working on ‘their’ countries within the Execution Department is not seen as undermining the 
Court’s independence. However, the Execution Department will never advise, or be asked to advise, 
on a particular judgment which is in the process of examination by a judicial formation.85 The fact that 
drafting lawyers and Judges play their cards close to their chest can cause problems, as laid bare in 
the 2017 case of Burmych and Others v Ukraine. Here, a Grand Chamber—having examined the Court’s 
role under Article 46—decided, by ten votes to seven, to strike out more than 12,100 applications in 
order for them to be dealt with by the CM in the framework of its supervision of the general measures 
required to implement Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v Ukraine,86 a pilot judgment concerning prolonged 
non-enforcement of domestic court decisions. The CM and the Execution Department appear to have 
been blindsided by what a former Council of Europe official called an ‘earthquake’ decision.87 Judge 
Yudkivska et al., in their joint dissenting opinion in Burmych, note that 
the Committee of Ministers was not at all consulted with a view to specifying the relevant 
mechanisms and arrangements for transferring thousands of undecided applications to them. 
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… Regrettably, this does not necessarily point to constructive dialogue and division of powers 
between the Court and the Committee of Ministers.88 
It appears, then, that the firewall between the two institutions is most accurately described as a semi-
permeable structure, allowing for information to flow freely from the execution side to the Court, but 
not so freely in the opposite direction.  
 
The Court’s authority to order remedies: encroachment upon the Committee of Ministers’ role? 
The Court’s preparedness to be specific and/or prescriptive is also curbed by Judges’ awareness of the 
need not to unduly encroach upon the CM’s role under Article 46. We found ample evidence that 
Judges are sensitive to the fact that ‘each actor has been assigned its particular functions under the 
Convention’, to quote a senior Court official.89 Given that the Convention, under Article 46(2), places 
the responsibility for supervising the execution of judgments with the CM, the Court ‘will be extremely 
reluctant to be seen to be acting extra legum or ultra vires’.90 This may explain why Strasbourg 
interlocutors were eager to establish the Court’s authority in the domain of execution by recalling that 
it was the states parties themselves, represented in the CM, that first invited the Court in 200491 to 
‘assist states in finding the appropriate solution’ to structural and systemic dysfunctions. Judge 
Sicilianos (writing extrajudicially) regards this resolution, together with two subsequent CM 
recommendations, as evidence of states acquiescing to the Court’s authority to indicate remedial 
measures.92   
It is appropriate here to differentiate between pilot judgments and Article 46 judgments. Whereas 
the legal basis for the pilot judgment procedure is no longer contested,93 commentators observe that 
some Judges’ caution may stem in part from a lack of confidence about the scope of powers conferred 
on them by the Convention.94 It is true that neither Article 46 nor Article 41 ECHR95 explicitly confer a 
power on the ECtHR to indicate specific non-monetary individual or general measures. Moreover, the 
Court’s practice direction on just satisfaction claims restricts its competence by stipulating that 
[o]nly in extremely rare cases can the Court consider a consequential order aimed at putting an 
end or remedying the violation in question. The Court may, however, decide at its discretion to 
offer guidance for the execution of its judgment (Article 46 of the Convention). 96  
Nevertheless, most Judges would subscribe to the view that pronouncing themselves on the remedial 
implications of a violation is within the Court’s remit. Judge Sicilianos, writing extrajudicially,97 points 
to three Convention provisions which serve as a legal basis for such practice: Article 46, Article 19 
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(concerning the role of the Court to ensure respect for the Convention), and Article 32 (pursuant to 
which the Court is competent to rule upon its own jurisdiction where this question is disputed). The 
last of these provisions has been invoked by the Court on those rare occasions when there have been 
challenges to its jurisdiction to indicate implementation measures.98 Moreover, there is no evidence 
of states refusing to give effect to a ruling by suggesting that the Court had acted ultra vires: as one 
official within the Registry noted, ‘I have never heard [the Court] being criticised for having a weak 
legal basis for Article 46’.99 In particular as regards individual measures, our interviewees even suggest 
that a broader notion of authority to specify remedial action might be coming to the fore inside the 
Court, whereby Judges and Registry staff today see few limits to the types of individual measures they 
are competent to indicate. As one Judge argues:  
The way that the Court’s case law has developed, the position now is that the Court reserves its 
right, or [considers that it] has the competence, to provide for any individual measure which it 
considers directly necessary to remedy the finding of a violation.100 
A remarkable example of Judges’ readiness to innovate is the stipulation that Lithuania, which had 
hosted secret detention sites run by the Central Intelligence Agency, should ‘make further 
representations’ to the United States—a non-Council of Europe member state—with a view to 
removing or at least limiting the effects of multiple Convention violations suffered by the applicant.101 
Yet, such judicial creativity remains contested.102 While Judge Pinto de Albuquerque challenges the 
oft-repeated axiom that the Court’s judgments are ‘essentially declaratory in nature’,103 other Judges 
assert that ‘the Court is invested with no competence, of any kind, in the field of the execution of 
judgments’104 (emphasis added). This throwback to the traditionalist view of the Court’s role is 
manifestly at odds with clear signals emanating from the Execution Department, which is open to a 
more proactive stance of the Court on remedies. These signals have penetrated the walls of the 
Human Rights Building, which houses the Court. According to one Judge, the message from the 
Execution Department  
is always about precision, about detail, about being as clear as possible so that their lives are 
made easier. Because if they get something very vague, they do not know what to say to the 
state…105 
Another Judge said that senior representatives on the execution side believe that, ‘the best strategy 
[is for] the Court to give as much indication as possible … in order to push politically in the Committee 
of Ministers.’106 A third had received information that the Execution Department ‘would of course 
welcome more prescriptive-type reasoning—it simply helps them in their work and we are well aware 
of that.’107 
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(iv)   Specificity and prescriptiveness: Door half open or door half shut? 
 
Judges’ remedial strategy in any given case is affected by a variety of factors, which sometimes pull in 
opposite directions. In order to avoid ill-designed measures, Judges will seek to ascertain, before 
adopting an Article 46 or pilot judgment, how susceptible the respondent state is likely to be to a 
directive judgment. We have seen that, in doing so, the Court—acutely aware of its geographical and 
temporal distance from the case at hand—is wary not to be seen as overreaching its judicial function, 
either by unduly curbing states’ discretion or encroaching upon the role of the CM. These factors, 
which would seem to close the door to the Court being directive in its judgments, are offset by Judges’ 
developing sense of responsibility—fostered by signals of encouragement from the Execution 
Department—to address problems of non-implementation and uphold the interests of victims by way 
of specificity or prescriptiveness. What is more, increasing interaction between the Court and the CM 
appears to have boosted Judges’ confidence in their ability to make well-informed assumptions about 
the likely impact of remedial directions, so that, in sum, the door remains open for the Court to adopt 
a more proactive stance on indicating remedies.  
 
4.   IMPACT OF THE COURT’S REMEDIAL PRACTICE ON THE 
EXECUTION PROCESS  
 
What, then, is the basis for the view of many Strasbourg specialists that execution is positively affected 
by specificity and/or prescriptiveness, and is it shared by others? The following discussion captures 
the perspective of Strasbourg actors (A) and actors at the domestic level (B), which will allow us to 
assess how far the principal reasons for the Court’s cautiousness identified in section 3 are borne out 
by evidence at the execution stage. We shall see that, both sets of actors identified tangible benefits 
to the execution process that had accrued from the Court’s decision sometimes to be specific and/or 
prescriptive, whereas risks were largely framed in hypothetical terms or seen as confined to isolated 
examples. Taken as a whole, our interviewees vindicated what they saw as the Court’s cautious and 
pragmatic remedial practice, whilst not advocating a decisive turn towards greater specificity or 
prescriptiveness.  
 
A.   The View from Strasbourg  
 
(i)   Benefits of specificity and/or prescriptiveness 
 
Interlocutors in Strasbourg identified two principal benefits of specificity and/or prescriptiveness: 
providing guidance to support good faith efforts towards implementation; and mitigating bad faith 





Providing guidance to states that are willing to implement  
Even where a respondent state acts in good faith to give effect to an adverse ruling, there may be 
uncertainty or disagreement as to what the judgment requires.108 In such situations, as Keller and 
Marti note, ‘clarity as to the precise obligations arising out of an adverse judgment may have positive 
effects on compliance’.109 This positive effect was confirmed by several interlocutors in Strasbourg. An 
interviewee from the Court’s Registry ventured that: ‘The more [a state is] … advised, the more likely 
it is that the state—if it is a law-abiding, rule of law state—will do what is necessary.’110 One effect of 
specificity and prescriptiveness is to strengthen the hand of conscientious domestic actors in the face 
of financial or technical obstacles to implementation. In such cases, as an official within the Secretariat 
of the CM observed, it ‘can be really useful ... to have it clearly pinpointed what the country is 
supposed to do because the country wants to do it. There’s a political will to do it’.111  
Another senior official argued that a degree of specificity by the Court can facilitate dialogue 
between domestic actors and the Execution Department since ‘it creates at least a presumption of 
what the direction should be’, adding that remedial indications need not be ‘extremely 
prescriptive’.112 This suggests that the Execution Department will be less concerned with where, in the 
judgment, the measures are spelled out, that is, whether the judgment is prescriptive or 
recommendatory. The same official ventured that specificity is helpful for states because ‘they see 
what the Court expects’, an observation confirmed by a Government Agent who argued that, while 
the Court should limit—and justify—its indication of specific remedial measures, it should, at the same 
time, ‘remain very attentive to giving clear, precise and adequate guidance’ in its judgments.113 This 
observation implies a distinction between judgments which are specific and/or prescriptive, and 
judgments which ‘diagnose’ the root causes of a violation without going so far as to specify remedial 
measures or invoke Article 46. This diagnostic aspect114 may be as persuasive to domestic actors as 
remedial indications per se, and the distinction between the two may not always be readily 
apparent.115 The above mentioned CM official confirmed the positive effect of the Court even merely 
identifying ‘where the problems are’, arguing that this ‘creates a kind of obligation of result whereas 
it leaves the choice of means to the state.’116 Judgments that do contain Article 46 stipulations may 
likewise only go as far as specifying the outcome rather than the means,117 suggesting that there is a 
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blurred line between purely ‘diagnostic’ judgments and Article 46 judgments, and that the Court may 
not be entirely consistent in respect of when it decides to invoke Article 46.  
 
Applying pressure on unwilling actors 
Remedial indications are viewed not only as assisting conscientious state actors, but also as reducing 
the scope for recalcitrant actors to frustrate implementation, by making non-implementation easier 
to identify. This renders states more susceptible to pressure both at the supranational and domestic 
level, shrinking their ‘leeway for justifying non- or partial compliance’ and thereby improving 
accountability.118  
The potential for specificity and prescriptiveness to increase accountability is especially relevant in 
the Convention system, in which the onus is principally on governments to identify suitable remedies, 
under the CM’s supervision.119 Governments may use the absence of specific remedies as an excuse 
to propose the narrowest possible solution to the dysfunctions identified by the Court. As one Judge 
noted, ‘states that do not want to implement sometimes use the vagueness of the Court’s analysis as 
a pretext’.120 Another Judge likewise observed that states acting in bad faith will ‘take advantage’ of 
inconsistency in the Court’s language, effectively telling the Court ‘you did not express your will clearly 
enough and we don’t feel bound by the judgment’.121 By implication, as a former senior Court official 
observed: 
[W]here there is an Article 46 chapter, people within the Execution Department and the other 
governments would be pleased that their conversations could focus on the remedies that the 
Court has mentioned, and that they can request the state, in their implementation plan, to 
reflect these remedies.122 
The same interviewee noted that this effect is yet more pronounced in the case of prescriptive 
judgments, which may achieve results even in politically sensitive cases. A notable example was Del 
Río Prada v Spain, in which the Court ordered Spain to release ‘at the earliest possible date’ a woman 
convicted of multiple terrorist offences on the basis of violations of Article 7 (no punishment without 
law) and Article 5(1) (no unlawful detention).123 The former senior Court official ventured that where 
indications are in the operative part: 
[T]he Committee of Ministers will feel that there is nothing to discuss. The Court has ordered it, 
and that’s that.... [In] Del Río Prada, the Spanish government ... let the person out 
[immediately]…. It was ordered by a court, it’s an international court, its orders are binding, so 
they felt they had no option.124 
By the same token, another former senior Court official, now working in the Secretariat of the CM, 
argued that it would have been useful had the Court been specific and prescriptive in the case of Ilgar 
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Mammadov v Azerbaijan,125 concerning the politically-motivated arrest and pre-trial detention of Mr 
Mammadov, an opposition politician, in which the Court found multiple violations of Article 5 of the 
Convention (right to liberty) and a violation of Article 18 (restriction on rights for unauthorised 
purposes) in conjunction with Article 5.126 Unlike Del Río Prada, the Mammadov judgment did not 
stipulate that the applicant should be released. Noting this apparent inconsistency, the interviewee 
argued that 
it would have been very useful for the Court to have said very clearly ... ‘and Ilgar Mammadov 
must now be released immediately’ because we’ve had to have a whole legal argument with 
Azerbaijan within the Committee of Ministers about what the implications are [of] the 
judgment.  
To the extent that the Court’s decision not to be either specific or prescriptive has emboldened 
Azerbaijan in its obstructive behaviour, the deleterious consequences have been laid bare with the 
decision of the CM in December 2017 to invoke, for the first time, the infringement procedure under 
Article 46(4) of the ECHR, on the grounds of Azerbaijan’s prolonged refusal to achieve as far as possible 
restitutio in integrum by releasing Ilgar Mammadov127—a demand made by the CM in its first 
examination of the case three years earlier and reiterated in numerous decisions and Interim 
Resolutions thereafter.128 However, even judgments that do prescribe individual measures may not 
immediately yield the desired results, as exemplified by Fatullayev v Azerbaijan,129 in which the Court 
ordered the release from prison of a wrongfully-sentenced journalist on the basis of violations of 
Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 (right to a fair trial)—a result that was not immediately 
forthcoming,130 despite overwhelming pressure from the Council of Europe and elsewhere.131  
Even if not all specific and/or prescriptive judgments bear fruit, a positive consequence may be to 
enhance dialogue during the CM’s quarterly human rights (DH) meetings, at which government 
representatives examine the execution of ECtHR judgments. A senior official within the CM highlighted 
the ‘tremendous effect’ that specificity and prescriptiveness can have in framing the discussion among 
the ministers’ deputies, since ‘[b]oth the respondent state and other member states, in the framework 
of the collective guarantee of the system, position themselves on the basis of what the Court has 
said.’132 Judgments recommending or prescribing general measures aimed at remedying structural or 
systemic problems were seen as especially helpful in identifying solutions to shared problems, thereby 
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making the supervision process more cooperative.133 A Court official who was previously seconded to 
the Execution Department had, for instance, witnessed within DH meetings the sharing of expertise 
on remedying inhuman or degrading conditions of detention, occasioned by the Court’s pilot 
judgment in Varga and Others v Hungary,134 which made reference to the detailed remedial 
indications in the Torreggiani and Others v Italy135 pilot judgment.136   
In respect of identifying the impact of specificity and prescriptiveness on the execution process, 
however, a note of caution is required. This is because specific and/or prescriptive judgments are 
almost invariably supervised by the CM under the more intensive ‘enhanced’ procedure as part of the 
twin-track approach adopted in 2011,137 meaning that they are debated more frequently at DH 
meetings. Moreover, given their complexity, the Execution Department will usually intensify its efforts 
to provide targeted technical assistance to the respondent state.138 Insiders observe that the 
combined effect of these tools—remedial indications and the enhanced supervision procedure—is 
bearing fruit. As noted by a Court official who previously worked in the Execution Department:  
[T]he type of replies you get from states to these judgments [containing remedial orders] ... has 
been geared up a level ... because of two things: ... indicative measures and the way it works 
with the twin-track procedure process. And it's definitely meant that states engage in 
discussions about the enhanced cases during the Committee of Ministers' meetings.139 
At the same time, the CM’s modus operandi presents a methodological difficulty, for it makes it hard 
to identify the impact of specificity or prescriptiveness as such, separately from the effect of the more 
proactive monitoring that occurs under enhanced supervision. This may explain why there are so few 
studies that attempt to quantify how the Court’s remedial indications influence execution.140 Our 
qualitative methodology precludes any such assessment; we may conclude, however, that in the view 
of actors both within the Court and the CM, specificity and prescriptiveness have—by means of both 
‘carrot’ and ‘stick’—assisted the execution process. 
  
(ii)   Risks of specificity and/or prescriptiveness 
 
Notwithstanding these advantages, we have seen (at Section 3.B.i) that Judges and officials of the 
Court are acutely aware of ‘getting it wrong’ when they specify or prescribe remedial measures. Actors 
on the execution side are also aware of the consequences of an ill-judged remedial indication in terms 
of frustrating the execution process and making any failure to comply more visible, with potentially 
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damaging repercussions for the authority of the Convention system. Such judgments may be 
counterproductive if they decrease the flexibility of the CM and its Execution Department during the 
post-judgment phase. A Court official who temporarily worked in the Execution Department noted 
that such judgments may be problematic because 
execution is half a political process and half a legal one. [T]here are [potentially] lots of ways 
that the state can go to get [the required] result and an indicative measure can undermine 
that.141  
This risk was identified by several interviewees as being greater in respect of general measures than 
individual measures where, as an official in the Execution Department noted, ‘you should have more 
leeway and … provide more possibilities for the state to propose solutions.’142  
Another concern was expressed that, if the Court is prepared to specify or prescribe (individual or 
general) measures in certain cases, states might interpret the absence of remedial indications in other 
similar cases as suggesting that no such measures are required. Such an inference drawn from the 
Court’s silence may be erroneous—but, as we have seen in Mammadov, all too tempting for a 
recalcitrant state. Moreover, states may in good faith misinterpret the absence of specific indications, 
or they may inadvertently regard specific indications that are (for whatever reason) non-exhaustive 
or insufficiently ambitious as setting a ‘maximum on what the state owes the victim’.143 This risk of an 
ill-judged remedial indication leaving a victim under-compensated was implicitly addressed by one 
Government Agent, prominent within the CDDH, who asked: 
Can we rely on the [completeness] of … the advice or even prescription by the Court? I think the 
answer is ‘never’ because [more measures may be required] and this really depends on ... 
dialogue with the Committee of Ministers.144  
To be aware of this risk is not necessarily to call for either more or less specificity or prescriptiveness 
on the part of the Court; rather, it implies the need for consistency and transparency in the Court’s 
use of such indications, in order that caution on the Court’s part is not used by states as a pretext for 
inaction. At the same time, it should not be assumed that when the Court remains silent on remedial 
measures, then so should the CM. Indeed, both current and former staff of the Execution Department 
emphasised that the execution process is sufficiently flexible to accommodate instances in which, 
either by action or omission, the Court is seen to have occasionally erred.  
Such instances were, in fact, rarely raised by our research participants and none considered ill-
judged remedial indications to be more than occasional lapses, or to have significantly hampered 
execution. One example was the Court’s Article 46 indication in McDonnell v UK,145 concerning delays 
in inquest proceedings into the death of the applicant’s son in prison. The judgment required the UK 
to take ‘all necessary and appropriate measures’ to ensure compliance with the procedural 
requirements of Article 2 ECHR (right to life), ‘in the present case and in cases concerning killings by 
the security forces in Northern Ireland.’ A Registry official, who previously worked in the Execution 
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Department, described the Article 46 chapter as ‘completely irrelevant’ because the applicant’s son’s 
death was unrelated to the legacy of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, adding, however, that the CM 
had responded flexibly by deciding to continue its supervision of delays in non-legacy inquests 
separately from delays in legacy inquests.146 Criticism was also levelled at the unusual degree of 
specificity and prescriptiveness in Youth Initiative for Human Rights v Serbia.147 Here, the Court 
ordered the Serbian intelligence agency to provide the applicant with unlawfully-withheld information 
on the use of surveillance. The former Deputy Registrar of the Court argued that the prescriptive 
measure—especially since the Court’s jurisprudence was not settled, at the time, on whether Article 
10 (right to freedom of expression) protects the right to access to state-held information148—was 
‘really quite wrong’ and ‘flew in the face of [the Court’s] own principles’.149 The order was, however, 
implemented.150  
A third example offered was Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine, in which the Court—unanimously—took 
the unprecedented step of ordering Ukraine in the operative provisions to reinstate a Supreme Court 
judge ‘at the earliest possible date’ after he had been unfairly dismissed, in addition to general 
measures to rectify systemic problems as regards the functioning of the Ukrainian judiciary.151 Here, 
strikingly, interviewees in Strasbourg disagreed as to the wisdom of this prescription. One Judge 
ventured that the Court ‘went too far’ since it was ‘too tricky to order an individual measure without 
hearing [from] all the involved persons’.152 By contrast, an official in the Execution Department 
described the Court’s approach as a ‘timely and pertinent indication for the execution process’, and 
‘a success story … from the point of view of the specificity of the indication’,153 given that Mr Volkov 
was ultimately reinstated154 and that significant progress has been achieved in respect of the general 
measures required, including both legislative and constitutional reform.155  
These differing assessments of Volkov illustrate the way in which the still evolving nature of the 
Court’s remedial practice, driven by the imperative to aid execution, is open to interpretation based 
as much upon its (perceived) efficacy as conformity with a normative desire for consistency for its own 
sake. The contradictory views may also reflect the disagreement within the Court as to the legal effect 
of where in the judgment a specific measure is indicated.156 At the same time, Volkov was the only 
pilot or Article 46 judgment referred to in such dichotomous terms. Overall, interviewees in both the 
Court and the CM viewed the benefits of specificity and prescriptiveness as outweighing the potential 
downsides, whilst not proposing any abrupt change to the Court’s practice.    
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B.   Domestic Viewpoints on Specificity and Prescriptiveness 
 
If Strasbourg actors are largely positive about the Court’s developing remedial approach, can the same 
be said of actors at the domestic level? This section examines evidence as to how specific and/or 
prescriptive judgments are received domestically by (i) state actors and (ii) non-state actors. We have 
seen (at 3.B.ii) that the Court, in recommending or prescribing remedial measures, is wary of inviting 
accusations by state actors of undermining the principle of subsidiarity through judicial overreach. At 
the same time, it may be expected that non-state actors would welcome greater directiveness as a 
way of exerting leverage over unwilling state actors. We shall see that neither of these expectations 
is fully borne out, as both state and non-state actors are more realistic and more attuned to the 
dilemmas facing the Court than this dichotomy would suggest.   
 
(i)   State actors: evidence of pushback?  
 
It is perilous to generalise about the perspective of actors across the 47 Council of Europe states on 
the Court’s remedial practice; yet we detected no pattern of pushback against directiveness on the 
part of the Court.157 We shall examine, first, the view of states parties to the Convention as expressed 
in reports and declarations issued under the auspices of the CM and, secondly, the perspective from 
the capitals (principally, Government Agents), so far as it can be ascertained.   
 
Reports and declarations of the CM  
As noted at 3.B.iii, it was states parties, represented in the CM, that in 2004 originally invited the Court 
to assist states to find ‘appropriate solutions’ to underlying systemic problems.158 They returned to 
the issue in the 2016 CDDH report on the longer-term future of the Convention system,159 which 
reiterated that the execution process ‘could be facilitated’ if the Court were to ‘indicate more clearly 
in its judgments which elements … constituted the direct sources of the finding of the violation’.160 
This appears to endorse the type of ‘diagnostic’ judgment referred to in 4.A.i, which may or may not 
involve the inclusion of an Article 46 chapter; hence, the CDDH report neither condones nor criticises 
the use of Article 46 as such. The CDDH did not, however, support a proposal to formalise a practice 
whereby the Court would routinely ‘indicate general measures in its judgments’;161 and nor did it 
endorse indication of individual measures ‘beyond these exceptional cases, where the nature of the 
violation found may … leave no real choice as to the measure(s) ... required to remedy it’.162 It also 
discarded a reform proposal (which would arguably have severely hampered the work of the CM) to 
allow the Court to expressly indicate in appropriate cases that, apart from the payment of any just 
satisfaction awarded, no other measures (individual or general) appear to be required.163 Taken as a 
whole, the CDDH report does not imply any criticism of the Court’s current remedial practice, yet is 
reluctant to see any regular or formalised recourse to the indication of general measures which, as 
noted at 2.B, constitute a majority of the Court’s specific and/or prescriptive judgments.  
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In respect of other collective expressions of the CM’s will, it is striking that none of the declarations 
arising from high-level conferences,164 from Interlaken in 2010 to Copenhagen in 2018, refers 
expressly to the Court’s remedial practice. This is despite the emphasis placed on the principle of 
subsidiarity, especially at Brighton in 2012 and Copenhagen in 2018, which might have been expected 
to prompt concerns about the Court curtailing states’ margin of appreciation regarding execution. 
Conversely, the emphasis in Brussels in 2015 on the ‘shared responsibility’ between states parties, the 
Court and the CM to implement the Convention, could have been a spur to encourage the Court to 
get more involved in the execution of its own judgments, including through greater directiveness. The 
silence on the issue in the declarations suggests that the Court’s remedial practice has simply not 
registered at the political level within the CM. By contrast, the favourable references in the CM’s 
Annual Reports to the Court’s role in assisting the execution process through its recommendation of 
remedial measures may reflect the fact that CM officials, through their daily interactions with states, 
are more attuned to the implications of this incremental, yet significant, development of the Court’s 
practice than their political masters.165  
 
The view from the capitals  
Given the difficulty of identifying the variety of perspectives across 47 states, we first sought the view 
of Government Agents who, by virtue of their roles in the CDDH, are well-situated to make an informed 
assessment of the ‘mood music’ surrounding the Court’s remedial practice.166 These sources, like the 
CM’s collective pronouncements, broadly endorsed the Court’s current practice but cautioned against 
a decisive shift towards greater directiveness.  
Vít A. Schorm, Government Agent in respect of the Czech Republic, emphasised the value of 
dialogue during the execution process, both between domestic stakeholders and between the 
domestic and supranational levels.167 Combined with technical assistance from the Execution 
Department, he ventured, dialogue yields solutions that may not be initially apparent even to the 
Government Agent and still less to Judges in Strasbourg:  
I think … that if the Strasbourg Court were to become more prescriptive, it would create many 
difficulties. .… [The CM] is far better equipped because you can really have an informal talk with 
the Secretariat, … and if you really don't know what to do, you can try to find a solution with 
them.  
Isabelle Niedlispacher, the Belgian Government Agent, agreed that ‘most other Government Agents 
and most national actors would in general not welcome a more specific and prescriptive approach by 
the Court’ due to the ‘risk of confusion between the role of the Court and the role of the Committee 
of Ministers.’168 Nevertheless, she ventured that clear remedial directions could boost the negotiating 
power of pro-implementation authorities to, for example, get resources allocated for the execution of 
a judgment. The Court seems well aware of this: an interviewee in the Registry ventured that: ‘If we’re 
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getting the message back from the Agent that it’s useful to have very prescriptive or directive 
judgments, then I think we should support that.’169  
The Court’s increased sensitivity to execution matters can thus be said to extend to an awareness of 
the need to identify ‘allies’ in the respondent state. As one Judge argued: 
I think this is a legitimate strategy of the Court: giving some impetus to the implementation 
process and help[ing] some groups on the national level to have some political force—but not 
to be too decisive on the question of how a certain result to be achieved.170 
This approach is endorsed by officials on the execution side: one interviewee within the CoE’s 
Directorate General Human Rights and Rule of Law observed that the Court’s decision to be specific 
or prescriptive can have ‘a very potent impact’ on the domestic debate. One former official from the 
Execution Department, speaking about Belgium, noted that 
often, when the Court says there is a systemic problem … [domestic officials] totally agree, and 
they are ... happy to have some help from the Court, and ... additional arguments coming from 
Strasbourg to help get other national interlocutors on board.171  
Frequently, when the Court opts to specify general measures, it has already explored the systemic 
problem at the origin of many similar cases. Such remedial practice, then, does not disavow the 
importance of dialogue at the execution stage, but seeks to ‘channel the discussions’ in a particular 
direction.172 A compelling example is the pilot judgment in W.D. v Belgium,173 concerning the 
internment of mentally-ill offenders, which was described by one academic observer as the ‘only way 
to get a structural solution’.174 Although before the Court the government initially opposed the 
application of the pilot judgment procedure (on the basis that the issue of internment did not affect 
an entire category of people and was already being resolved),175 several interviewees noted that the 
judgment decisively strengthened the hand of those actors, including the responsible unit within the 
Ministry of Justice, who were pushing for comprehensive reform.  
The Court is, in this sense, aware of speaking with precision to particular state actors, such as 
Government Agents, since as one Court official put it, ‘Agents do … [compare] cases either within the 
country or between countries’.176 This creates an imperative for the Court to be consistent in its 
remedial practice. At the same time, the fact that many domestic actors lack specialised knowledge 
of the more nuanced or technical aspects of the Court’s judgments177 may partly explain the lack of 
political pushback against directive judgments. The Court’s occasionally intrusive remedial practice 
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has simply not become a ‘political’ issue for states unlike, say, its dynamic interpretation of the 
Convention, which has frequently provoked accusations of judicial overreach.178 
 
(ii) The pragmatism of non-state actors   
 
It may be expected that civil society actors, to the extent that they are attuned to developments in 
Strasbourg case law, would seek to maximise their leverage over state actors, and would thus 
encourage greater directiveness on the part of the Court. Indeed, some civil society interlocutors did 
express a preference for such an approach. According to a representative of the League of Human 
Rights in the Czech Republic, the strategic nature of its litigation, which aims at structural or systemic 
reforms, means that ‘it would be great if [the Court] were more specific. For us, that would be a lot 
more helpful’.179 A representative of the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association likewise ventured that,  
it’s always better ... if the Court writes down directly what kind of measure [the] government 
[should] take... [I]t makes our work easier because … the government has no discretion whether 
to apply this measure or that.180  
At the same time, an NGO activist involved in the case of Identoba and Others v Georgia,181 concerning 
the state’s failure to protect demonstrators from, and effectively investigate, homophobic violence, 
argued that it would have been unrealistic for the Court to specify the general measures required to 
effect systemic reform in areas such as police behaviour and changing prejudicial societal attitudes: 
the Court had elucidated the origins of the violation, ‘and that gives the ground to the [CM] to produce 
the … more specific recommendations about what [Georgia] should do … in terms of institutional 
reforms’.182  
A similar degree of realism was evident in comments by an academic member of the Committee 
of Experts on the Execution of ECtHR judgments, a consultative body formed by the Czech Government 
Agent to recommend general measures in appropriate cases; she ventured that, while clarity is 
essential, 
[t]here is always a risk that if [the Court is] too specific [it will] be seen as interfering too much 
into the discretion that should be left to the state… If you deprive [states] of that they will not 
… be willing to have a dialogue … because they will feel like this is a dictate.183 
While these comments may not represent the spectrum of civil society perspectives, they undermine 
any assumption that civil society actors necessarily have unrealistic expectations of what Judges can 
achieve. Rather, they suggest a pragmatic approach which demands an appropriate degree of 
specificity either on the part of the Court or the CM. At the same time, no civil society interviewee 
raised the issue of specificity and prescriptiveness of their own motion, suggesting that the Court’s 
remedial practice (and, indeed, the execution process as a whole) is not at the forefront of their 
concerns or is poorly understood.  
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In sum, while neither state nor non-state actors advocated any radical change in the Court’s 
remedial approach, nor did they strongly criticise it. Thus, the political space within which the Court 
may develop its practice might be broader than supposed. It is to this future development that our 
final section turns.  
 
5.   CONCLUSION—NAVIGATING THE TENSION BETWEEN 
CONSISTENCY AND PRAGMATISM 
 
The Court’s case law on Article 46 is not ‘fossilised in the past’,184 but is fluid and evolving.185 This has 
included considerable creativity as to the nature of the remedies indicated.186 Still, it is important not 
to overstate the extent of jurisprudential innovation, since (as established at 2.A) specific and 
prescriptive judgments remain a small fraction of the Court's case law. Amid no little judicial 
dissension, how is the Court’s remedial approach likely to develop—and what direction should it take? 
This section considers these questions through the prism of the tension between a normative desire 
for consistency and the requirement for pragmatism dictated by the Court’s overriding desire to 
facilitate implementation of its judgments in the interest of actual and potential victims.    
Throughout this article, we have identified a number of areas of judicial disagreement, 
inconsistency or procedural frailty. Conflicting visions about the Court’s remedial practice have 
created, as one Judge ventured, ‘a rather haphazard case law ... when we are, on a case-by-case basis, 
looking into the possibilities of saying something more than simply declaring a violation.’187  
We have identified that specific remedial measures (regardless of their place in a judgment) are 
worded in various ways, sometimes using imperative language, and at other times a less emphatic 
tone (1.A). Nor do Judges agree as to whether remedial indications in the reasoning have the same 
legal force as directions in the operative provisions (1.A). We have also alluded to inconsistencies as 
regards the invocation of Article 46, there being a blurred line between judgments containing 
indications under that provision and purely ‘diagnostic’ judgments (4.A.i). Arguably more far-reaching 
repercussions arise from inconsistency whereby the Court does not always stipulate specific, non-
monetary individual measures even when there appears to be only one possible form of redress, as 
the case of Mammadov v Azerbaijan (discussed at 4.A.i) reveals, and from cases in which the Court is 
occasionally perceived to have erred in its recommendations or prescriptions (see 4.A.ii).   
These factors suggest that the Court’s remedial practice is in flux, or, as a Registry official opined, 
‘a learning process for everybody—states, Court and Committee of Ministers’.188 The Court’s practice 
has reached ‘a certain maturity’, she added, but is far from stable. The question then arises as to how 
problematic some degree of instability is. We have seen that actors in Strasbourg, and notably at the 
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ECtHR, appear to be more concerned about (actual or hypothetical) inconsistency than domestic 
actors are. However, Government Agents and other informed state actors were also said to be aware 
of contradictions, creating a risk that states will, for example, use the absence of remedial indications, 
or vagaries in the use of terminology, to frustrate implementation (see 3.B.i; 4.A.i and ii). We concur, 
therefore, with a Judge who ventured that the Court’s ‘already rich’ case law on remedies would 
benefit from consolidation,189 which in turn will require Judges to find common ground on contentious 
areas.  
How far, then, should the Court go to achieve such consolidation, given that codification of its 
practice would inevitably constrain its flexibility to act on a case-by-case basis? Our interlocutors, both 
in Strasbourg and at state level, eschewed the idea of reforming the Convention itself, since to do so 
would open a Pandora’s box in a climate of hostility to the Court within some states.190 Moreover, 
such reform was viewed as unnecessary, given that states have not challenged the Court’s authority 
to be specific or prescriptive.191  
There was reluctance, too, to reform the Rules of Court, save for one proposal to institutionalise a 
process whereby the parties to a case would be invited to make submissions on the matter of 
remedies, in order to create a more informed basis for the Court’s assessment of possible measures 
under Article 46.192 One Judge ventured that the Court is increasingly able to identify those cases in 
which it would be assisted by pleadings on the remedial issue, adding: 
I do think this is something we need to reflect upon because there is a procedural 
weakness at the remedial stage when that issue is not fully transparent and fully argued 
… and that may necessitate changes of the Rules of Court.193   
Another Judge endorsed this view, since discussion with the parties to a case yields remedial measures 
that are better adapted to domestic context and prevents the Court from inadvertently producing any 
‘surprises’.194 Indeed, the benefits of the Court systematically inviting submissions on remedial 
measures may go further still if such a practice were to encourage states to think more proactively 
about implementation even while a case is pending before the ECtHR. Likewise, civil society 
organisations could take it upon themselves to engage with the implementation process more actively 
than they presently tend to do, both domestically and supra-nationally. Certainly, judicial appetite for 
submissions on remedies creates every incentive for applicants to indicate proactively, from the start, 
what measures they deem necessary—and for civil society actors to consider this dimension not only 
in their briefings to DH meetings,195 but also in third party interventions before the Court.   
This proposal aside, we detected great caution about tying the Court’s hands by seeking to codify 
its remedial practice. Such concern is well-founded given Judges’ evident desire to maximise their 
leverage on a case-by-case basis. A senior Registry official argued that apparent inconsistency is 
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frequently ‘an attempt to be ... flexible and adjust to the national circumstances’,196 at the same time 
as assisting the CM in its execution function. Moreover, as noted at 2.D, judicial pragmatism has not 
led to anomalies with certain states receiving either a disproportionately large or small number of 
specific and/or prescriptive judgments. Pragmatism, then, does not denote appeasement: the fact 
that Judges decide upon their remedial approach in anticipation of a state’s reaction has not, we 
submit, led them to be unduly accommodating of uncooperative states or to sacrifice the interests of 
victims. Nor, we recall, is there clamour for reform of the Court’s practice from the CM or the 
Execution Department; on the contrary, a senior official within the CM argued that it would be 
‘premature to expect the Court to take a definitive stand’ on its remedial practice and that such a 
development might even create tensions with the CM where none exist.197 
Barring such reform, it seems certain that the Court’s remedial approach will continue to evolve. It 
is an open question as to whether that will be in the direction of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, which is recognised as taking the boldest approach to reparations of all supranational human 
rights bodies,198 or whether those forces within the Court (and beyond) will prevail who want to see 
Judges exercise restraint and even return to a practice of issuing purely declaratory judgments.199 That 
such debates are live within the Court was underscored by a Judge who observed that ‘some Judges 
really want to push’ and regard the Inter-American Court as an exemplar.200 The same Judge added, 
however: ‘I think this Court has a different tradition and ... we have to accept that there is another—
political—body and that the execution primarily is its competence. So we have to be careful.’  
Our research suggests that, at this juncture, the Court is likely to chart a middle course, neither 
foreclosing the evolution of this aspect of its case law, nor accelerating the pace of change. As it does 
so, we submit that continued—and even intensified—contact with the CM and Execution Department, 
as well as other Strasbourg institutions concerned with implementation, will be crucial to ensure that 
the Court becomes ever more sensitised to matters of execution. At the same time, Judges are 
evidently aware of the need to maintain a realistic view of their relative position in the ensemble of 
judicial and political actors both at the national and supranational level, in keeping with the principle 
of subsidiarity. One Judge correctly notes that, in an enforcement system based upon ‘political will 
and pressure’ it is justifiable for a supranational court to take into account the need for remedial 
measures to be ‘persuasive and acceptable to the stakeholders’, since ultimately, ‘the system doesn’t 
work unless the recipients are willing to acquiesce to the ... judicial power that is at play here’.201 
Encouragement from the Execution Department and the absence of any sustained challenge by states 
suggest that, as Judges navigate the course between consistency and pragmatism, they enjoy a wider 
political latitude than they might suppose—space that they may well use to meet the imperative of 
promoting execution in the interests of actual and potential victims. The door is firmly open to 
evolution, if not revolution, in the Court’s remedial practice.  
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